We’ve seen in our discussion of TCP’s three-way handshake that a server allocates and initializes connection variables and buffers in response to a received SYN. The server then sends a SYNACK in response, and awaits an ACK segment from the client. If the client does not send an ACK to complete the third step of this 3-way handshake, eventually (often after a minute or more) the server will terminate the half- open connection and reclaim the allocated resources.

This TCP connection management protocol sets the stage for a classic Denial of Service (DoS) attack known as the SYN flood attack. In this attack, the attacker(s) send a large number of TCP SYN segments, without completing the third handshake step. With this deluge of SYN segments, the server’s connection resources become exhausted as they are allocated (but never used!) for half-open connections; legiti- mate clients are then denied service. Such SYN flooding attacks were among the first documented DoS attacks [CERT SYN 1996]. Fortunately, an effective defense known as SYN cookies [RFC 4987] are now deployed in most major operating systems. SYN cookies work as follows:

  • When the server receives a SYN segment, it does not know if the segment is com- ing from a legitimate user or is part of a SYN flood attack. So, instead of creating a half-open TCP connection for this SYN, the server creates an initial TCP sequence number that is a complicated function (hash function) of source and des- tination IP addresses and port numbers of the SYN segment, as well as a secret number only known to the server. This carefully crafted initial sequence number is the so-called “cookie.” The server then sends the client a SYNACK packet with this special initial sequence number. Importantly, the server does not remember the cookie or any other state information corresponding to the SYN.

  • A legitimate client will return an ACK segment. When the server receives this ACK, it must verify that the ACK corresponds to some SYN sent earlier. But how is this done if the server maintains no memory about SYN segments? As you may have guessed, it is done with the cookie. Recall that for a legitimate ACK, the value in the acknowledgment field is equal to the initial sequence number in the SYNACK (the cookie value in this case) plus one (see Figure 3.39). The server can then run the same hash function using the source and destination IP address and port numbers in the SYNACK (which are the same as in the original SYN) and the secret number. If the result of the function plus one is the same as the acknowledg- ment (cookie) value in the client’s SYNACK, the server concludes that the ACK cor- responds to an earlier SYN segment and is hence valid. The server then creates a fully open connection along with a socket.

  • On the other hand, if the client does not return an ACK segment, then the original SYN has done no harm at the server, since the server hasn’t yet allocated any resources in response to the original bogus SYN.

results matching ""

    No results matching ""